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1~0. 6253 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
.JOH~ A. ~Lt\.LIA, State Bank Con11ni~sioner of th~ 
State of Utah, a11d HERB~~l~ ' l., T .'\ YLOR, as Exam · 
iner in Chai~ge of the I_jiquidation ~of the Bank of 
Heber City, Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
J. HAROLD GILES AND JO·SIE BAIRD GILES, 
Defendants and Appel1ants, 
A. c. ~fOULTO·N AND E. DEvVEY lVIOULTON, 
vs. Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
\TERNOR E. BAIRD ~L\_ND MARY A. BAIRD, His 
"' ife, J. RUI.JON MOl{G .. A.K, J. RULON MORGAN 
as the Surviving Partner of the Firm of ~lorgan & 
~forgan, a Co-Partnership, ELIZABE'rH J. 
BAIRD, B.ANIC OF HEBER Cirry, RULON F. 
S'rARLEY, State Bank Cominissi~oner of the· State 
of Utah, and SPENCER C. TA YLC)R., as Examiner 
in fiharg·e of Iji~niclRtion of the Bank of Heber City, 1410 
ARTHUR D1JI{:B~ .AYD E1TT~EAN DUJ{E, I-Iis \Vife, Civil 
RA.Y F , S~tfiTII .8:. .TORIE BAIRD GILES SMTTH 
His Wife, AND J. HAROLD GILES, 
· Defendants and Appellants, 
J. RUIJON MOR.GAN; Cross-Complainant, 
vs. 
R1TLON F. START.JEY, as Bank Com1nissioner of 
the State of Utah, and SPENCER C. TAYI..JOR, as 
Examiner in Charge of the ljquidation of the Bank 
of Heber City, Cross-Defendants. 
Appellants' Brief on Respondents' Petition 
for Reh~arit1g 
'ELI.LI\.S HANSEN; J. R,Ul..JON ~10RG 1\N, 
Attorneys for Defendants and Appellants 
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
JOHN .A .. MALI ... t\., State Bank Cnunnissioner of the 
State of Utah, and HERB~~R'P T .\ YLOR, as Exa1a· 
iner in C'harge of the Liquidation ·of the Bank of 
Heber City, Plaintiffs and Rt.1spondents, 
v~. 
J. HAROLD GILES AND JO·SIE BAIRD GILES, 
Defendants and App~ellants, 
.A .. C. l\IOULTO·N AND E. DEWEY ~IOULTON, 
vs. Plaintiff8 and Respondents, 
\~ERXOR E. BAIRD AND MARY A. BAIRD, His 
"\Vife, J. RlJLON l\10RGAN, J. RULO·N MORGAN 
as the Surviving Partner of the Firm of ~forgan & 
Morgan, a Co-Partne1·ship, ELIZABETII J. 
B ... t\.IRD, B.A.NT~ OF HEBER CITY, RUL.ON F. 
srrARLEY, State Bank Con1missi~oner of the State 
of Utah, and SPENCER- C. T.A. YLC,R, as Examiner 
in Charg·e of Lic..~..n1idation of the Bank of Heber City, 1410 
·civ .. il ARTHl"'"R. D1~I(E A~D ElTI~E_A.N Dl1 TCE, His '\Vife, 
RAY F. S:JIITH ~:JOSIE B:AJR-D GILES S1v!TTH 
His Wife, AND J. HAROLD GILES, · 
Defendants and Appellants~ 
J. RUIJON MORGAN) Cross-Complainant, 
vs. 
RUIJOX F. STARI.JEY, as Bank Commissioner of 
the State of Utah, and SPENCER C. TAYLOR, ·as 
Examiner in Charge of the I.Jiquiclation of the Bank 
of Heber City, Cross-Defendants. 1 
Appeal From Fourth District, 'Vasatch County. 
Honorable Dallas H. Young, Judge. 
Appellants' Brief on Respondents' Petition 
for Rehe~r1ng 
.A.n examination of the brief in sup·port of the peti-
tion for rehearing and a re-examination of the 
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original briefs filed in this cause, show that there 
is nothing of substance in the brief in support of 
a rehearing that w.as no~t discussed at length in the 
original briefs. We huv\rever deem it advisable to 
brie·fly answer the latest argument of respondents. 
On page two of their brief criticism is made of the 
statement in the opinion heretofore rendered \vhere 
it is said that 
'~there is no evidence in the ease that 
\\~r).uld justify the -be·lief that Mr. Giles \Vas 
authorized to sig:n his wife's name to any 
instrument.'' 
.... -\n examination of the evidence shows that this 
Court "\Vas absolutely right in making the foregoing 
statement. The-re is not in this entire record a 
scintilla of evidence that shows, or 'tends to sho\v, 
that prior to or after the transaction here involved 
·Mr. Giles ever signed or "\Vas ever authorized to sign 
his wife's name to any written instrument. 
lt is the apparent position of resp·ondents that he-
cause Mr. Giles operated his wife's farm and used 
the water represented by the ce,rtifica.tes of stock 
belonging to his wife, he there hy acquired a right 
to mortga.ge or sell the farm and wateor stock. The 
fact that Josie's husband operated the farm and 
cared for her sheep does not justify the conclusion 
that Mr. Giles had either apparent or implied au-
th!ority to hypothecate the shares of \Vater stock. 
''Apparent authority or ostensible author-
ity, as it is also called, is that "'.vhich, though 
not actually granted, the principal kno\\"-
ingly pPrmits tl1e agent to exercise, or 
'vhich he holds himself out as possessing.'' 
2 Am. Jur. 83, a.nd cases there cited. 
"The apparent or implied authorit~r of an 
agent cannot he so extended a.s to permit 
l1irn. to rlenart from the usual manner of 
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3 
accomplishing ''"hat he is employed to ef-
fect. Nor can he enlarge hiS' powers by 
unauthorized representations and p·rom-
ises. . . . Moreover the apparent author-
ity fur 'vhich the p.rincipal may be liable 
n1ust be traceable to hin1 and cannot be es-
tablished solely by the actions and conduct 
of the agent; the princip~al is. :only liable 
for that appearance of authority caused 
by himself. . . . Furthermore, a party 
dealing with an ag.,ent must prove that the 
facts giving eolor to the agency were known 
to hiln "'"hen he dealt w·ith the agent and 
that he believed the agent "\vas acting within 
his authority. If he ·has no knowledge of 
such facts he does not act in relian~e upon 
them and is in no position to claim anything 
on account of them.'' 
;-. "m J 8f"' ~ ~'"""\.. . ur. t:>. 
''Authority conferred on an agent to sell, 
though accompanied 'vith the possession of 
the property to be sold, confers no actual 
or ostensible authority to apply or trans-
fer the property in pa~rrne·nt of his oWn 
deht, and one who so takes the property, 
though in good faith, cannot ordinarily 
hold the same against the principal.'' 
2 Am. ,Jur. 97. 
"It is also accepted, that an agent is 
not authorized to pledge the property, 
goods or securities of his principal merely 
because he is authorized to sell them.'' 
2 Am. Jur. 98 . 
. An application of anv one of the roregoing princi-
ples to the facts in thi~ eaRe "ill defe·at the claim 
of the bank to a lien on the '""a.ter Rtock in question. 
All of the evidence affirmatively shows that Harold 
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4 
Giles did not have authority to hypothecate the 
stock; nor is there any evidence which calls for the 
app~lication 1of the doctrine of implied or ostensible 
authority of an ag'ent to bind the principal, or thBt 
the hank relied upon anything that J·osie had done 
,o,r failed to do which was calculated to mislead the 
bank into the belief that Mr. Giles,.·had authority to 
hypothecate the stock. The note which the bank 
claims is secured by the stock, is the note of Mr. 
Giles. Moreover, the language of 
R. S. U. 1933, 18-3-1 
provides that a certificate of capital stock in a cor-
poration may he transferred only, 
" (1) By delivery of the ce-rtificate en-
dorsed either in blank or to a specified per-
son by the person appearing by the certifi-
cate to be the owner of the shares repre-
sented thereby or 
(2) By delivery of the certificate and a 
separate document containing a written 
assignment, and the assignment or a 
power of attorney to sell, assign or trans-
fer the same or the shares represented 
therPhy, signed by the person app~earing 
hy the certificate to he the ovmer of the 
shares represented thereby. Such assign-
Inrnt or po,vPr of attorney n1ay be either 
in blank or to a specified person.'' 
The foregoing provisions are as clear as the En-
glish language can make them to the effect that 
shares of stock cannot be transferred by pa:rol. 
The owner of the stock must si~n his name, Indicat-
. ing an intention to dispose thereof or s:ome interest 
therein. In ~nch particular the transfer of sto(llc is 
~imilar to the transfer of re.a] estate. ln the ab-
~~nrP of a "rritten jnstrum~nt signpd by the party 
to he bound, an att(~mpted transfer is a nullity. 
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Such provisions dispose of the claim of the bank to 
a lien on Certificate No. ti~. Josie Baird (Giles) was 
the o'vner, and apparent O\vner, of that certificate. 
She did not endorse that certificate. She n1ade no 
'vritten assignment thereof nor gave to anyone a 
power of attorney to transfer the srune. 
It is argued that other provisions of Chapter 3 tend 
to modify the provisions of Section 18-3-1. Vv .... e can 
:find no language in the other sections of that chap-
ter " ... hich sup·port such contention. 'fhere are other 
pl'ovisions of the chapter ,, ... hich may defeat a claim-
ant to stock even though there has been a. com-
pliance with Section 18-3-1. 'Under the pro,·-isions of 
Section 18-3-7 
there is granted the right to rescind notv. .. ithstand-
mg there has been an endorsement 
''where the endorsement or delivery was 
procured by fraud or duress or if the de-
livery of a certificate··,Yas. made 'vithout au-
thority from the O\\-rner, unlPss the certifi-
cate has ~een transferred to a purchaser 
for value in g~ood faith '"ithout notice of 
any fact n1aking~ the transfer \Vrongful, or 
the injured person has elected to ~vaive the 
injury or has been guilty of laches in en-
deavoring to enforce his rightR. '' 
As to Certificate No. 64 it 'vill be noted that under 
the provision of 
R. S. U. 1933, 18-3-7 
Josie had a right to rescind the action of her hus-
band unless the bank "ras a purchaser for value in 
good faith without notiee of any facts making the 
transfer wrongful, or unless she elected to \vaive 
the injury or was guilty of laches in endeavoring 
to enforce her right. 
The opinion of thi~ Conrt to the effect that the bank 
had notice of facts that preclude the said bank 
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6 
from claiming that it acted in good faith is in ac-
cord with the repeated holdings of this Court and 
with the law as announced by the authorities gen-
erally. One who has n~otiee or knowledg:e of facts 
which if followed up would lead to the acquiring 
of knowledge of the ultimate fact, may not claim 
that he was 'vithout knowledge of such ultimate fact. 
Reese-Howell Co. v. Brown, 48 Utah 142; 
158 P. 684. 
Salt l;ake City v. Salt Lake Investment 
Co. 43 Utah 183; 134 P. 603. 
Gibson v. Jensen, 48 Utah 2'44; 158 P. 426. 
\Vright v. Bailey, 45 Utah 584; 147 P. 899. 
The bank was familiar with the signatures of both 
Mr. and 1\tirs. Giles . They both dre\V checks. on the 
l:>ank. The bank is thus chargeable with knnv;ledge 
of the fact 'that the signature on one of the certifi-
eates was not the signature of Mrs. Giles. the o'vner 
of the stock. There \Vas no \vitness to the purported 
signature of Josie Blaird Giles on either of the cer-
tificates. The two certificates were delivered to the 
bank at the san1e time. If such facts did not put the 
'bank on ·notice that there was probably something 
wrong about the right of Giles to hypothecate the 
stock, it is difficult to conceive of a state of facts 
short of actual knowledge that would have tha;t 
result. 
The cases of Brown v. Wright and Garfield Bank-
ing Co. v. Argyle cited by respondents recognize 
the general rule. The facts in those cases are. so 
unlike the facts in this case that neither of them 
lends support to the claim that respondent hank 
'vas a purchaser in g1ood faith without notice of the 
lark of authority of J\!r. Giles to hypothecate the 
stock. nor is there anv evidence in this case tending 
/ ~ 
to show that Josie waived her right to the stock 
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freed fr"~oru the clain1ed lieu of the bank or that she 
. ' \Yas gu1lty of any laches. \\hen she returned to 
Utah soon after she learned fron1 her rnother that 
the bank held the stock, Bhe "\vent to the bank and 
\vas informed that the stock \Yas held by the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank. She then went to the Federal 
Reserve Bank and asked to see the certificates but 
the bank informed her that they were in the vault 
and she could not see them. She then infor1ned the 
bank that she had never signed the certificates. 
Tr. 235; Ab. 168. 
Keither the Federal Reserve Bank nor the Bank ot 
Heber City loaned ru1y money on the ceTtificates 
after Josie informed them of her claim to the stock 
freed from any clain1 <of the banks. Respondents 
seem to claim son1ething because Josie did not 
make a formal demand for the certificates. Having 
asked for and been denied the opportunity to see 
the certificates, and having informed th(l hank that 
she did not sign the same~ such stateinents clearly. 
constituted notice to the hank that she claimed the 
certificates. Moreover, a demand \vould haYe been 
usele~s and therefore unnecessary. The la~N does 
not require the doing of a useless thing·. 
VanDyke v. Ogden Savin~·s Bank, 48 Utah 
606: 161 P. 50. 
Pool v. 1fotter, 55 Utah 288; 185 P. 714. 
f\tnliDings et ux v. Nielsen ct al, !2 Utah 
169 : 129 p. 619 . 
Obrecht v. I_Jand and ''Tater Co-., 44 Utah 
270; 140 P. 117. 
The statement is made on pagr four of respondents~ 
brief that "it mav he held "Tithout nndue stretch-
ino· of the facts that Jo~de (}jles and her 'husband, 
-, 
liarold Giles, were partners; . . . tl1at Mr. Giles 
had full power to handle all property and busjness of 
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8 
Josie; ... that borro,ving n1oney on security was 
a regula.r practice of Harold Giles from the day oi 
marrying Josie Baird in 1924 to the time of their 
divorce in 193'4. '' 
The evidence does not sup:port those statements. 
So f·ar as appears, Harold never at any time eithef 
before or after the transaction here involved boT-
rowed any money on the security of J osi~ 's p ro11-
erty. We do not know just wha£ is mea11~· hy the 
staten:ent that it does not require an undre strt~h·Jt­
iu,g Of the facts to COnclude that ,JOSle anc her hu~­
band Harold were partners. It certainly would re-
quire an undue stretching of the evidence to find 
that a p~artnership existed bet,v~~·:~a J.o~ie and IInr-
old. All that can be said under thE- evidenee i:-; that 
IIarold operated the property belonging," to ,J osic in 
about the same manner as any hus.band operf'tes the 
property belonging to his wife where the hi1shand 
is and the wife is not a farmer. It is quite appar-
ent that ,Josie did not regard Harold as having R!lJ 
right to her property. When she sold her home and 
loaned the money to Harold she took a note as evi-
dence of the loan. 
It is s-aid on page six of respondents' brief that be-
cause there was the follo,ving notation on the back 
of the note which Harold gave to Josie, '' $1505.35, 
Bank-7th October,'' tha.t.itberefore Josie had com-
plete knowledge of Hafiold 's dealings. That Josie 
knew that H.a.rold horro,ved money from the bank 
is not questioned, but to say that she knew that 
Harold had hypothecated the stock, !is to ignore the 
evidence and engage in ·pure sp·eculation. 
Contrary to the statement made by respondents on 
pag1e six, it 'vas $1500.oo· and not $1505.35, that "Tas 
paid to the bank on October 7, 1929. In any event, 
the fact that Harold paid s:ome of the money loaned 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to hin1 by his 'vife, on hi~ note at the bank does not 
even remotely tend to sho'\v that Josie authorized 
or knew that Harold had hypothecated he.r stock 
as security for the loan. 
The inquiry is made on page seven of respondents' 
brief, ''Why did she take a note from her husband, 
Harold Giles~'' The answer to such inquiry is 
obvious. She took the note the same a.s any other 
person loaning money takes a note, naJnely, as evi-
dence of the loan made to her husband and with the 
hope that sometime he would}repa.y the money thus 
loaned to him. 
Touching case No. 1410 Civil, it is again argued that 
George B. Stanley was not the attorney for Josie 
Baird Giles (Smith) and that the interest of Vernor 
E. Baird was and is not adverse to the interest of 
the Moultons. It is true that ·~fr. Stanley testified 
that Vernor employed him. However, he prepared 
the documents for both Vernor a.nd Josie. The 
mere fact that \ 1 ern or made the arrangements with 
Mr. Stanley is not of controlling importance. Ob-
viously Vern or could act for himself and Josie 
in employing an attorney to draw up the necessary 
documents to consummate the deal. The relation 
of client and attorney may be 1 created by contract 
'vhich is implied, as well as express.ed. The services 
rendered by Mr. Stanley were as much for tl1e bene-
fit of Josie as for Vernor. Moreover, as we poi:nted 
out in our original brief (pages .43 and 44) if Mr. 
Stanley was not the aQ"ent for .T osie, the note and 
1nort~a.ge were nP,rer. deHvered -never hecame the 
obligation of Vernor and no action can he main-
tained thereon. 
On pag-e eight. of l"PRnondents' brief it i~ rontendeit 
that this Court " .. fl ~ in error '"'hen it said that 
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10 
'' Geor~g~e B. Stanley placed his clients' 
property in the hands of third parties, to 
the clients' detriment.'' 
RespondentR then proceed to argue that there was 
no conflict of the interests of Vernor E. B:aird and 
the 1foultons. Such statement is made in the face 
of the fact that the M.oultons in this very suit sought 
judgment against ''Vernor E. Baird ruH.l Mary A. 
Baird his wife, for the principal suin of $15,000.00, 
tog1ether with interest thereon at the rate ~of seven 
percent p~er annum f~om October , 10, 1934 uri til 
paid. For the further sum of $750.00 as and for 
attorne~ys' fees,'' for the foreclosure of the Inort-
gage, and ''for judgment a.nd execution against the 
defendants Vern or E. Baird and Mary A. Baird his 
wife, for any deficiency which may remain after 
applying all of the proceeds fro1n the sale ·of said 
premises, water rights . and water stock properly 
applicable to the satisfaction of plaintiffs' judg-
ment.'' 
l t 'vould indeed he a ne\v doctrine, to hold that there 
is no conflict of interest between plaintiffs Yvho seek 
such a judgment and a defendant who may he com· 
pelled to satisfy such a judgment. B·ut it is said 
on page nine of respondents' brief that it was stip-
ulated before the trial commenced that no de.ficiency 
judgment \vould he taken in the matter. We repeat 
what we snid in our original brief, that there, was 
no such stipulation~ hut apparently plaintiffs' coun-
sel realized that it would he unconscionable to re-
ceive full p·ayment of a n1ote for $15,000.00 principal 
and s.everal years·' interest when such note \vas bi.d 
in for only $100.00. No such generosity was shown 
when the note was purchased and ''ThPn the suit 
was brought, and the only reraRonable concluRior 
permissible under the facts disclosed by this record 
is that no such concession "\\Ta,s ~iven beea.use o.f a 
deRire to accord to any of the defendants fair play 
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but \\Tas done in an atten1pt to eoYer up if possible, 
what ha.d theretofore been done. 
\Vhen Plaintiff Addison C. ~foulton was being cross 
examined at the trial, he stated that he did not 
make any bid beyond $100.00, and ""ould have been 
a "damn fool" to bid against himself." (Tr. 396; 
Ab. 207). 
On page nine of respondents' brief it is urged that 
because Josie signed a note as security for her hus-
band, that therefore Mr. Stanley was at liberty to 
disregard his obligation to both ·vernor and Josie. 
This too is a doctrinP \Yithout support either in la·w 
or good morals. Nor \Yill either Josie or Harold be 
released from paying their hone.st obligations by 
reason of the opinion heretnforp render0d 1)y this 
Court~ 
In their brief~ exception is also taken to the sta~e­
ment of the Court's opinion \vhert:in it said that. 
"but for the acts of Mr. Stanley, 'T ~rnor 
Baird's obligation to his sister would have 
been p'eaceably settled.'' 
The evidence sho\VS such statP1nent b) Le 1n accor·(1 
with the fact. Josie and Vern or ha.d, according to 
all the evidence, agreed upon a settle,ment. ·v ernor 
was to have his note returned to him, and the prop-
erty and water stock was to he conveyed to their 
n1other. It is further sHid that 
''there is nothing in the record to show they 
were not peaceably settled.'' 
No excepti10n is or can be sureessfully taken to the 
further lan,gnage in the opir)ion of the Court "rhere .. 
in it is said: 
''Instead the Bairds are forced throu.g·h a 
law suit with strangers to the transartion, 
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simply because the attorney upon 1.Vhom 
Mr. Baird relied, instead of looking after 
his client's interest~, hy taking advantage 
of certain legal processes, placed his cli-
ent's property in the hands of third partie~ 
to the client's detriment." 
It might well be added that if the present clients of 
l\lr. Stanley shall prevail, Vernor Baird ma:y 
well be called upon to res1)(•nd iu damages because 
of the warranties contained in the deed which he 
executed and delivered to hi8 rnother. 
It is finally suggested that because Vernor Baird 
"\Vas out with sheep and did not return until s·oone-
time after the trial began, that therefore '' Vernor 
had no interest in the trial and the other defendants 
\VC·.:-~ hopeful thPt h0 mig bt ~ho'v up to testify for 
them.'' Here again respondents seem to contend 
that Vernor V\"as not at all concerned as to whether 
or not his agreement with Josie and his mother 
Ehould be held for naught; whether a deficiency 
judgment which might run into thou~ands of dol-
lars might be rendered against him and his \Vife, 
or whether he should be compelled to make good the 
warranties contained in the deed t0 his mother. 
If Vern or was SIQI dumb a.s to be unconcerned about 
such matters it would seem a proceeding a~:ainst 
him could he had only through a guardian. "f\Vp had 
always understood the law to be that a party liti-
g'ant haB a right to appear hy couns~l and if such 
a party finds it impossible or inconvenient, or if 
for any other re,ason he choose's not to attend court 
throughout the trial, s11 c:h fact is not evidence that 
his cause should fail. 
Respondents are like,vise in ~rror when they say on 
page ten of their brief that George B. Stanley \vas 
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still representing \ ~ernor .B.J. Baird on :b,el>ruary 3, 
1938. Mr. Stanlev testified, 'fr. 402 · Ab. 209: ''I ~ ' do not kno"" "'"hether I 'vas his attorney on Feb-
ruary 3, 1938, because the work V/as not done at 
his request but for his benefit. He con1e to get the 
deeds. '' The fact that Vernor called for a tleed 
does not, in the light of the evidence in this case, 
justify the conclusion that ~Ir. Stanley \\7aa not the 
attorney for \"" ernor in the transaction here Jn-
volved. Mr. Stanley admits that he 'vas. 
In their brief, on page nine thereof, respondents 
again criticise the action of J. Rulon Morgan for 
preparing the documentS' necessary to .consummate 
the agreement theretofore had between Josie, Ver-
nor and his mother- In our original brief we have 
discussed this phase of the case, and no useful pur· 
pose can be served by enlarging upon 'vhat is there 
stated. 
The vetition for rehearing should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ELIAS HANSEN, 
J. RULON MORG_J\.N, 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Appellants. 
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